The Impact of Insurance Provision on Households’ Production and Financial Decisions by Cai, Jing
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Impact of Insurance Provision on
Households’ Production and Financial
Decisions
Jing Cai
University of Michigan
9. May 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46864/
MPRA Paper No. 46864, posted 9. May 2013 18:10 UTC
The Impact of Insurance Provision on Households’
Production and Financial Decisions∗
Jing Cai†
University of Michigan
October 21, 2012
Abstract
Taking advantage of a natural experiment and a rich household-level panel dataset, this paper
tests the impact of an agricultural insurance program on household level production, borrowing,
and saving. The empirical strategy includes both difference-in-difference and triple difference es-
timations. I find that, first, introducing insurance increases the production area of insured crops
by around 20% and decreases production diversification; second, provision of insurance raises the
credit demand by 25%; third, it decreases household saving by more than 30%; fourth, the effect of
insurance on borrowing persists in the long-run, while the effect on saving is significant only in the
medium-run; and fifth, the impact of insurance is greater on larger farmers and on households with
lower migration remittance.
Keywords: Insurance; Production; Borrowing; Saving
JEL Codes: D14, G21, G22, O16, Q12
1 Introduction
Poor households in rural areas are exposed to substantial negative shocks such as weather
disasters, which can generate large fluctuations in income and consumption if insurance
markets are incomplete. To protect themselves from these risks, rural households undertake
risk management and coping strategies such as informal insurance, avoiding high risk-high
return agricultural activities, holding precautionary savings, and reducing investment in
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production (Morduch (1995), Rosenzweig and Stark (1989)). However, existing evidence
shows that informal insurance mechanisms cannot effectively reduce negative impacts of
regional weather shocks (Townsend (1994)). In the absence of formal insurance markets, the
negative shocks and forgone profitable opportunities can lead to highly variable household
income and persistent poverty (Dercon and Christiaensen (2011), Jensen (2000), Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1993)).
Although many developing countries have started to develop and market formal insur-
ance products to shield farmers from risks, take-up is usually surprisingly low, even with
heavy government subsidies1. While there is a growing literature studying ways to improve
insurance demand (Cole et al. (2011), Cai (2012), Cai and Song (2011), Bryan (2010)), rig-
orous evaluations of the impacts of insurance provision are quite rare. With a rich household
level panel data (2000-2008) from the Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC)2 of China, this paper
studies the effect of insurance provision on household’s production, borrowing, and saving
decisions. The program I am studying is a weather insurance policy for tobacco farmers
offered by the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC), starting from 2003 in selected
counties of Jiangxi province. It was expanded to more areas afterward and was implemented
province-wide at the beginning of 2010. Purchase of insurance was made compulsory for
tobacco farmers in treatment regions. I take advantage of the variation in insurance pro-
vision across both regions and household types (tobacco households vs. other households)
to estimate the effect of insurance provision on household behavior, focusing on the initial
stage of the policy in 2003.
The empirical strategy includes both difference-in-difference (DD) and triple difference
(DDD) estimations. Because purchase of insurance in treatment regions was compulsory,
household take-up decisions are not endogenous here. I use tobacco households outside
of the treatment region to control for industry-specific trends in outcomes, and use non-
tobacco households both within and outside the treatment region to control for region-
specific trends in the absence of the policy intervention. Thus the extra changes in household
behavior for tobacco households in treatment regions can be attributed to the insurance
policy implementation. I find the following. First, insurance provision has a significantly
positive effect on the production of the insured crop: it raises tobacco production by around
22% and decreases production diversification by around 29%. Second, insured households
tend to borrow more from the rural bank for investment in tobacco production, and the
1For example, Giné et al. (2008) found a low take-up (4.6%) of a rainfall insurance policy among farmers
in rural India in 2004, while Cole et al. (2011) found an adoption rate of 5% - 10% of a similar insurance
policy in two regions of India in 2006
2RCC is the most important financial institution in rural China. It is the main provider of microcredit,
and most farmers have saving accounts there.
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magnitude of effect is about 25%. Third, the insurance policy decreases the household
saving rate by more than 30%. Fourth, estimation of dynamic effects shows that, while the
effect of insurance policy on both borrowing and saving became significant shortly after the
policy was implemented, the impact on borrowing is persistent through the end of the sample
period, while the effect on saving became significant several years after the intervention and
decreased toward the end of the sample period. Finally, the impact of having insurance is
greater on larger farmers and on households with lower migration remittance.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it provides
insights on the literature about insurance take-up and impact. Estimating the causal effect
of insurance policy on household behavior is made challenging by the endogenous insurance
purchase decisions. There are a few papers studying the effects of insurance markets on
household behavior using different estimation strategies. For example, Cole et al. (2011) use
a randomized experiment which provided free rainfall insurance for selected farmers in India,
and find that the insurance induced farmers to shift production towards higher-return but
higher-risk cash crops. Karlan et al. (2012) use experimental methods and also find strong
responses of investment in agriculture from insurance provision in Ghana. Gine and Yang
(2009) implemented an experiment in Malawi which randomly bundled insurance with loans
for selected farmers, and they found a negative effect of insurance on borrowing. Carter et
al. (2007) use simulation method to show that insurance provision significantly improved
producers’ welfare, credit supply, and loan repayment in Peru. In contrast, Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1993) show by simulation that the gain from weather insurance for Indian
farmers was minimal due to the existence of informal insurance mechanisms. This paper
complements the existing literature by using rigorous estimation strategy to test both short-
term and long-term effects of insurance provision on households’ production, borrowing, and
saving behavior in China, taking advantage of administrative borrowing and saving data
from the rural bank. Because large and significant impacts of insurance policy are found in
this paper, it supports the proposition that studying ways to improve voluntary insurance
take-up is important.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature explaining low investment and technology
adoption in developing countries. Credit constraints and the lack of information or knowl-
edge are often proposed as explanations (Feder et al. (1985)). Duflo et al. (2011) argue that
behavioral biases limit profitable agricultural investments. This paper shows that the riski-
ness of such investments is an important barrier, and therefore reducing risk can persistently
improve investments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background for
the study and the insurance contract. Section 3 explains the data and summary statistics.
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Section 4 presents estimation strategies and results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Background
Tobacco is an important cash crop in China. There are more than 2,000,000 rural households
that live on tobacco production. The net profit of tobacco production is around 2000 RMB
per mu3, which is 3 to 5 times that of food crops such as rice.
In China, most tobacco producing counties are poor and mountainous areas. In the
province that I study, there are 12 main tobacco production counties. Those counties are in
two agricultural cities, Fuzhou and Ganzhou. Nearly half of those 12 counties are national
poverty-stricken counties. To reduce poverty, in the late 1990s, these counties started to
develop highly profitable tobacco industries by encouraging farmers to cultivate tobacco, or-
ganizing tobacco associations to teach farmers production techniques, etc. Taxes on tobacco
production are now the main source of government revenue in these counties.
However, as other crops, tobacco production can be greatly influenced by weather risks.
For example, in 2002, a flood destroyed most tobacco production in some of those 12 coun-
ties, which caused huge losses in household income and government revenue. The vice-head
of Guangchang County, who is in charge of finance matters was previously a manager of an
insurance company. He proposed to cooperate with insurance companies to shield tobacco
farmers from frequent weather disasters in order to give them more incentives to continue to-
bacco production. In 2003, the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC) designed and
offered the first tobacco production insurance program to households in four tobacco pro-
duction counties, including Guangchang, Yihuang, Lean, and Zixi. The policy was extended
to some other counties afterwards.
The insurance contract is as follows. The actuarially fair price estimated by the insurance
company is 12 RMB per mu. The county and town level government gives a 50% subsidy on
the premium, so farmers only pay the remaining half, around 6 RMB per mu. All households
whose main source of income is tobacco production were required to buy the insurance for
all their tobacco areas. The insurance covers natural disasters including heavy rain, flood,
windstorm, extremely high or low temperature, and drought. If any of the above natural
disasters happened and led to a 30% or more loss in yield, farmers were eligible to receive
payouts from the insurance company. The amount of payout increases linearly with the loss
rate in yield, with a maximum payout of 420 RMB. The loss rate in yield is investigated
and determined by a group of insurance agents and agricultural experts4. The average net
31 RMB = 0.15 USD; 1 mu = 0.067 hectare
4For example, consider a farmer who has 5 mu in tobacco production. If the normal yield per mu is 500kg
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income from cultivating tobacco is around 2000 RMB per mu, and the production cost is
around 400 RMB to 600 RMB per mu (not including labor cost). Thus, this insurance
program provides partial insurance that covers around 20% of the gross income or most of
the production cost.
3 Theoretical Model
Here I provide a two period, two state model to show how the provision of insurance influ-
ences farmers’ investment and financial decisions5. Intuitively, in the first period, insurance
provision increases farmers’ investment in production because the expected income from pro-
duction is higher in that case. As a result, insurance has a negative effect on saving and a
positive effect on borrowing. However, saving can be affected in two other ways. Because
income uncertainty is reduced by insurance, people have less precautionary incentive to save,
in this sense, saving tends to decrease. At the same time, if we assume that people have
rational expectations, if they expect to become richer in future periods, they will smooth
consumption across periods by increasing consumption and reducing saving in the current
period. Furthermore, if the purchase of insurance is subsidized, this has a positive effect on
farmers’ wealth, which has a positive effect on saving.
Consider a representative farmer who lives for two periods with initial wealth W0. In the
first period, the farmer consumes C1 and uses the remaining wealth for investment. There
are two ways to invest this money: one is to save it in the bank with a saving interest
rate Rf , the other is to invest it in a risky project like crop production which has a return
function F (·). The farmer can borrow from a local bank for investment in a risky project
with interest rate RB. So the total investment I on the risky project includes the initial
wealth less consumption and saving, and a loan equal to B from the bank. The return of
the risky project is uncertain because it depends on whether a disaster happens in period
one. In this simple model I assume that there are two states: a good state (no disaster) and
a bad state (disaster). In the good state, the farmer gets F (I), while in bad state he gets
nothing. Assume that there is no strategic default and that farmers have limited liability,
then in the good state, the farmer will repay fully in the second period; under a bad state,
the farmer default on the loan if he does not have money to repay.
Suppose that for a farmer who invests I on the risky project (production), in order to buy
and because of a windstorm, the farmer’s yield decreased to 250kg per mu, then the loss rate is 50% and he
will receive 420*50% = 210 RMB per mu from the insurance company.
5Throughout the model I assume that farmers who are provided with insurance buy it in every period,
because it is compulsory, while those who are not provided with insurance cannot buy it in any period.
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an insurance which covers all his production6, he needs to pay a premium which equals δI7.
The production insurance works as follows: in the bad state, the farmer will be reimbursed
by the insurance company by an amount equals to part of the cost invested in the risky
project, γI. As a result, even in the bad state, the farmer who purchased insurance will be
able to repay part or all of the loan.
In order to compare farmers’ financial and investment behavior depending on whether
they have insurance or not, I will solve the two-period model separately for insured and
uninsured farmers because in the second period, their consumptions are different in the bad
state. Throughout the model I assume that farmers are price takers: they don’t think their
behavior can influence either the premium charged by the insurance company or the saving
and borrowing interest rate set by the bank.
3.1 Two-period model when insurance is not provided
The optimization problem as follows:
maxC1,I,B U(C1) + EβU(C2)
⇐⇒ maxC1,I,B U(C1) + βpU [F (I)− (1 +RB)B + (1 +Rf )S] + β(1− p)U [(1 +Rf )S]
s.t. I = W0 − C1 − S +B
Assume that the return function and the utility function are:
F (I) = Iα, α < 18
U(C) = logC
Then the first order conditions are:
U ′(C1) = βpU ′ [F (I)− (1 +RB)B + (1 +Rf )S]F ′(I) = βpU ′(Cg)F ′(I)
(3.1)
βpU ′(Cg) [(1 +Rf )− F ′(I)] + β(1− p)U ′ [(1 +Rf )S] (1 +Rf ) = 0 (3.2)
βpU ′(Cg) [F ′(I)− (1 +RB)] = 0 (3.3)
⇒ F ′(I∗) = 1 +RB9 (3.4)
According to the return function form, I can rewrite equation (3.4) as:
6An assumption here is that to reduce the average risk and to prevent adverse selection, the insurance
company requires the farmer to buy insurance for all his production area.
7In my data, δ should be quite low because farmers only need to pay 6 RMB per mu to buy the insurance,
but the production cost (I) is around 400-600 RMB per mu.
8This return function form can exclude the case of infinite investment.
9This makes sense since project has return only in good states and it is the only time repayment is
required.
6
F ′(I∗) = αI∗α−1 = 1 +RB
⇒ I∗ = (1+RB
α
) 1
α−1 (3.5)
So the optimal level of investment is decreasing in the borrowing interest rate RB, or in
other words, people tend to investment more on the risky project when the cost of borrowing
is lower. Part 1 in Appendix A gives the solution of the above optimization problem.
3.2 Two-period model when insurance is provided
If a farmer has production insurance, the framework is as follows:
maxC1,B,S U(C1) + βpU [Cg] + β(1− p)U [Cb]
s.t.I = B + [W0 − C1 − S − δI]
⇒ I = W0−C1−S
1+δ
+ B
1+δ
Where Cg and Cb are the farmer’s consumption in period two under good and bad state,
respectively. The biggest difference in this model is that under bad state, the farmer receives
a reimbursement from the insurance company which covers part of their cost, which equals
γI = γW0−C1−S
1+δ
+ γ B
1+δ
, so I can write the return of production under bad state as γI. Since
I have assumed there’s no strategical default, the farmer will repay the bank γ B
1+δ
, which is
the return that is generated by a loan with size B. Given this, the consumption in period
two under two states is defined as follows, respectively:
Cg = F (I)− (1 +RB)B + (1 +Rf )S
Cb =
γ
1+δ
(W0 − C1 − S +B)− γ1+δB + (1 +Rf )S
The three first order conditions are:
U ′(C1)− βpU ′(Cg)F ′(I) 11+δ − β(1− p)U ′(Cb) γ1+δ = 0 (3.12)
βpU ′(Cg)
[−(1 +RB) + F ′(I) 11+δ ] = 0 (3.13)
βpU ′(Cg)
[
(1 +Rf )− F ′(I) 11+δ
]
+ β(1− p)U ′(Cb)
[− γ
1+δ
+ 1 +Rf
]
= 0 (3.14)
The utility and return function forms are the same as that in previous sections:
U(C) = logC
F (I) = Iα, 0 < α < 1
Part 2 in Appendix A gives the solution of the above optimization problem.
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3.3 Combine the two models
The expressions of the optimal investment, consumption, saving and borrowing for insured
and uninsured farmers are as follows:
I∗(insured) =
(
(1+RB)(1+δ)
α
) 1
α−1
I∗(unisured) =
(
1+RB
α
) 1
α−1
C∗1(insured) =
1
D+E
[
(RB−Rf )γ+(1+RB)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
(1+RB)(1+δ)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
W0 + (α
−1 − 1)(1+RB
α
)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1
]
C∗1(uninsured) =
1
1+β
[
W0 + (α
−1 − 1) (1+RB
α
) 1
α−1
]
S∗(insured) = (1+RB)(1+δ)
RB−Rf
E
D+E
(RB−Rf )γ+(1+RB)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
(1+RB)(1+δ)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
W0
+ (1+RB)(1+δ)
RB−Rf
E
D+E
(α−1 − 1)(1+RB
α
)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1 − γW0
(1+Rf )(1+δ)−γ
S∗(unisured) = (1+RB)(1−p)β
(1+β)(RB−Rf )
[
W0 + (α
−1 − 1) (1+RB
α
) 1
α−1
]
B∗ = (1 +RB)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
α
α−1α−
α
α−1 − D
1+RB
C∗1 +
1+Rf
1+RB
S∗
B∗(unisured) = (1 +RB)
1
α−1α−
α
α−1 − β[p(RB+1)−(1+Rf )]
RB−Rf C
∗
1
3.4 Break-even conditions of the bank
Now I have solved farmers’ optimization problem, the next step is to consider the break-even
conditions of the bank10.
If the bank’s client does not have insurance, he gets nothing in bad state, so the break-
even condition is:
B(1 +Rf ) = p(1 +RB)B
⇒ RB = [1 +Rf ] 1p − 1
If insurance is purchased, the break-even condition becomes:
(1 +Rf )B = p(1 +RB)B + (1− p) γ1+δB
⇒ RB =
[
1 +Rf − (1−p)γ1+δ
]
1
p
− 1.
In summary:
RB =
[1 +Rf ]
1
p
− 1, if not insured[
1 +Rf − (1−p)γ1+δ
]
1
p
− 1, if insured
We can see that the bank will set a lower interest rate for people who have insurance
because their repayments are better guaranteed.
10Here I assume that the institution’s objective is to break-even for simplicity.
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3.5 Conclusion of the model
Now I plug the interest rate into optimal decisions in 3.3 and compare the magnitude of
investment, consumption, saving and borrowing between insured and uninsured farmers.
• Investment: Farmers will invest more when they have insurance
I∗(insured) =
(
(1+RB)(1+δ)
α
) 1
α−1
=
( 1+Rf
p
− (1−p)γ
(1+δ)p
α
) 1
α−1
I∗(unisured) =
(
1+RB
α
) 1
α−1 =
(
1+Rf
p
α
) 1
α−1
Because α − 1 < 0, so if (1−p)γ
(1+δ)p
> 0, the investment increase as a result of insurance
provision. Intuitively, when insurance is provided, borrowing becomes cheaper and the ex-
pected return of the risky project will increase, so investing in the risky project becomes
more attractive.
• Consumption: The first period consumption is higher when the farmer have insurance.
C∗1(insured) = C
∗
1
= 1
D+E
[
(RB−Rf )γ+(1+RB)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
(1+RB)(1+δ)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
W0 + (α
−1 − 1)(1+RB
α
)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1
]
=
1
1+β
{[
1+RB
1+Rf
+
(RB−Rf )γ
(1+Rf )[(1+RB)(1+δ)−γ]
]
W0 +
(1+δ)(1+RB)[(1+Rf )(1+δ)−γ]
(1+Rf )[(1+RB)(1+δ)−γ] (α
−1 − 1)(Rf/p+1/p−(1−p)γ/p(1+δ)
α
)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1
}
C∗1(unisured) =
1
1+β
[
W0 + (α
−1 − 1)
(
Rf/p+1/p
α
) 1
α−1
]
Because 1+RB
1+Rf
+
(RB−Rf )γ
(1+Rf )[(1+RB)(1+δ)−γ] > 1, (
Rf/p+1/p−(1−p)γ/p(1+δ)
α
)
1
α−1 >
(
Rf/p+1/p
α
) 1
α−1
and (1 +Rf )(1− p)(1 + δ − δη) > Rfδη11
then C∗1(insured) > C∗1(unisured)
So the second message from the model is that, people who bought insurance will consume
more in the first period. This is because if a farmer has insurance, he expect himself to be
richer in the second period compared to the condition when he does not have insurance, so
he will smooth the consumption between periods by increasing the consumption in period
one.
• Saving: The provision of insurance can decrease farmers’ total saving and saving rate
in period one.
11This condition holds in my data.
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S∗(insured) = (1+RB)(1+δ)
RB−Rf
E
D+E
(RB−Rf )γ+(1+RB)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
(1+RB)(1+δ)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
W0+
(1+RB)(1+δ)
RB−Rf
E
D+E
(α−1 − 1)(1+RB
α
)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1 − γW0
(1+Rf )(1+δ)−γ
=
[
β
1+β
− βγp
(1+β)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
]
W0 + (α
−1 − 1)(1+RB
α
)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1 (1+RB)(1+δ)
RB−Rf
E
D+E
S∗(unisured) = β
(1+β)
[
W0 + (α
−1 − 1)
(
1/p+Rf/p
α
) 1
α−1
]
= β
1+β
W0 + (α
−1 − 1)α− 1α−1 (1
p
+
Rf
p
)
1
α−1 β
1+β
Because
[
β
1+β
− βγp
(1+β)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
]
< β
(1+β)
, so if W0 is large enough, S∗(insured) <
S∗(unisured) and Savingrate∗(insured) < Savingrate∗(unisured). This result is consistent
with the precautionary saving story: farmers’ future income uncertainty is decreased by
introducing insurance, so people have less precautionary incentive to save in the first period
for smoothing future consumption.
• Borrowing: The effect of insurance provision on borrowing is ambiguous.
The total investment on risky project is I = B + [W0 − C1 − S], I have proved that the
provision of insurance will increase C1 and I, and decrease S, so the effect on B is ambiguous.
In summary, the conclusion from this two-period model is that insurance has a positive
effect on investment in risky projects and consumption, and it reduces farmers’ total saving
and saving rate. As a result, its effect on borrowing is not determined.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
As shown in Table 1, the empirical analysis is based on data from 12 tobacco production
counties in Jiangxi province of China: Guangchang, Yihuang, Lean, Zixi, Shicheng, Ningdu,
Ganxian, Huichang, Xinfeng, Xinguo, Ruijin, and Quannan. Among these twelve counties,
only tobacco farmers in Guangchang, Yihuang, Lean, and Zixi were eligible to buy the
tobacco insurance policy after 2002. In eligible counties, only tobacco households whose
main source of income is from tobacco production were offered insurance, while households
working in other activities were not eligible to buy similar products.
The primary data source is the household level panel dataset, ranging from 2000 to 2008,
provided by the Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC). The whole sample includes around 6500
households. The data is composed of two parts. The first part is the administrative data
of RCC, including their clients’ saving and borrowing information12. Specifically, it has
12Because more than 90% of farmers in Jiangxi province are RCC clients, this data is representative of
the whole sample of farmers
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variables such as loan certification number, total borrowing during the year, interest rate,
use of loan, repayment, total annual saving, savings in the deposit account, savings in the
current account, and annual growth in savings13. The second part is RCC annual survey
data14, which contains two broad categories of information. The first is family background
information: age, national ID, gender, occupation and education of household heads, primary
and secondary source of household income, family address, and household size. The second
is household income and production, including total annual income, household income from
different sources, remittance income, area of land for cultivation, and production areas of
different crops.
The data includes 6548 households in total, of which 3580 households are tobacco house-
holds, and 2968 households are other households whose main source of income is not tobacco
production15. For tobacco households, 1429 of them are in the treatment region where the
insurance policy was available, and 2151 of them are in control regions.
The summary statistics of key variables before the insurance policy was implemented
(2000-2002) are provided in Table 2. Household heads are almost exclusively male and the
average age is around 40. The average household size is around five people, and household
heads have an average education level of between primary and secondary school. The above
household characteristics are very similar across different household groups. The average
annual household income of tobacco households in treatment regions equals 10,650 RMB,
while that of tobacco households in control regions is a bit higher, around 12,000 RMB.
Annual income of non-tobacco households is much lower, with only 7,270 RMB. Considering
households’ borrowing behavior, the average borrowing of non-tobacco households is the
highest (4,980 RMB), followed by tobacco households in control regions (4,560 RMB), and
tobacco households in treatment regions (3,900 RMB). The household saving rate is defined
as the ratio between net annual saving and household income. For tobacco households
in treatment regions, the saving rate is around 3.6%, which is lower than that of tobacco
households in control regions (4.5%). Saving rate of non-tobacco households is similar as
that of tobacco households in treatment regions, of around 3.4%16. This table suggests that,
as treatment and control tobacco households behave statistically differently in pre-policy
13While RCC is the main place for farmers to make deposits, households may have saving accounts in
other institutions. As a result, the amount of saving in RCC does not represent a household’s total saving.
To account for this factor, RCC reported the village-level ratio of RCC saving to total household saving. I
adjusted the RCC saving data by this ratio in all of the empirical analyses
14RCC implements a household survey every year in order to adjust the lending interest rate and loan
ceiling for each household
15These households work in agricultural activities such as rice production, cultivation, etc. or in non-
agricultural activities
16Households with outliers (the lowest or highest 1%) in income, loan size, and savings were deleted from
the sample for analysis
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periods, I cannot study the policy impact by taking a simple difference.
In order to check whether Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimation can be a convincing
strategy in this context, I test the common-trend assumption in Table 3, using the following
regression:
Yirt = η0 + η1Y eart + η2Insuranceir + η3Y eart ∗ Insuranceir + irt (1)
Where i, r, t are household, region, and year indices respectively. Insuranceir is the
treatment indicator equal to 1 for treatment regions and 0 for control regions. The common-
trend assumption does not hold if the coefficient of the interaction term, η3, is statistically
significant. Results show that the common trend assumption is not valid for all outcomes in
which I am interested in, so using only DD estimation is not sufficient.
To get a basic sense of how insurance provision impacts production, borrowing, and sav-
ing, I plot the evolution of these variables in Figures 1 to 5. Figure 1 shows that, while to-
bacco production was similar for tobacco households in treatment and control regions before
insurance was in place, production increased greatly in treatment regions after 2002. Refer-
ring to Figure 2, we can see that, while tobacco households in treatment regions borrowed
less than those in control regions before 2002, the pattern reversed after 2003. However,
Figure 3 shows that the borrowing pattern is different across the sample period between
non-tobacco households in treatment and control regions, which suggests that there might
be some regional-specific trend for which we should control when estimating the policy effect.
In Figure 4, I show that, for tobacco households, while the saving rate is higher in control
regions than in treatment regions, the trend reversed slightly after 2004. The difference
in saving rates of non-tobacco households between treatment and control regions is much
larger, as shown in Figure 5.
Table 4 reports the average area of tobacco production, size of loans, and saving rate by
time period, region, and sector eligibility. Consider loan size for example, for each region-
sector category, the average loan size increases from the period 2000-2002 to the period
2003-2008, reflecting the aggregate economic trend. For tobacco households, the average
loan size in treatment regions increases by 1,450 RMB more than that of households in
control regions. This could be a result of both the implementation of the insurance policy
and other region-specific changes. For example, for non-tobacco households, the average
loan size also grows faster in treatment regions than in control regions, by 480 RMB. Taking
into account this regional difference in the absence of the insurance policy, the loan size for
tobacco households in treatment regions increases by 970 RMB more than that for tobacco
households in control regions. The regression analysis in the next section demonstrates that
this effect is robust to controlling for other confounding factors. These results suggest that
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triple difference estimation can be a more convincing empirical strategy than DD in this
case.
5 Estimation Strategies and Results
5.1 Empirical Strategies
The implementation of the tobacco insurance policy introduced variations in insurance pro-
vision in three dimensions: years before and after the policy was introduced, regions with
and without the policy, and eligible and ineligible households (tobacco households v.s. non-
tobacco households). These variations allow me to use both difference-in-difference (DD)
and difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimation as the empirical strategy. First,
the DD analysis compares the change in tobacco households’ behavior in treatment regions
before and after 2002 with that of tobacco households in control regions, assuming that to-
bacco households in treatment and control regions follow the same trend in the absence of
the provision of insurance policy. The estimation equation is as follows:
Yirt = α0 + α1Afterit + α2Insuranceir + α3Afterit ∗ Insuranceir + irt (2)
Where i, r, t are household, region, and year indices respectively. This framework is based
on tobacco households only. Y represents outcome variables including tobacco production
area, size of loan borrowed from the rural bank, and saving rate. After is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for the 2000-2002 period and 0 for years 2003-2008, which reflects the impact on
outcomes of time-varying aggregate economic environment and policies. Insuranceir is the
treatment indicator equal to 1 for treatment regions and 0 for control regions. The coefficient
of interest is the one before the interaction term, between After and Insuranceir, α3.
However, the DD estimation cannot remove all confounding factors. For example, there
may be some other contemporary changes in the economic environment or other policies
specific to the treatment region that can influence households’ production and financial
decisions. This can be captured by taking another DD analysis, which compares behavior of
non-tobacco households in treatment regions before and after 2002 with that of non-tobacco
households in control regions. As a result, the DDD framework, which takes the difference
between the two differences from the first two steps, can further control for region-specific
trends. Under the DDD framework, we don’t need to assume that behaviors of tobacco
households in both treatment and control regions evolve similarly in expectation, but only
need to assume that the difference affects tobacco households and other households similarly
(in other words, there are no other region-sector specific policy changes). I will test this
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assumption later. The DDD regression is as follows:
Yijrt = β0+β1Afterit + β2Insuranceir + β3Tobaccoij + β4Afterit ∗ Insuranceir
+ β5Afterit ∗ Tobaccoij + β6Tobaccoij ∗ Insuranceir
+ β7Afterit ∗ Insuranceir ∗ Tobaccoij + ijrt (3)
Where j is sector indicator, and Tobaccoij is a dummy variable equal to 1 for tobacco
households and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of the time, region, and sector interaction
(β7) captures the average effect of insurance provision on household behavior, after other
confounding factors are removed.
Significant influences of insurance provision on households’ production and investment
decisions may take place either shortly after the policy was introduced or several years later,
and the magnitude of the effect may change over time. Consequently, it would be interesting
to test the dynamic effect of insurance provision on household behavior. The estimation
equation is as follows:
Yijrt = ρ0+ρ1Y eart + ρ2Insuranceir + ρ3Tobaccoij + ρ4Y eart ∗ Insuranceir
+ ρ5Y eart ∗ Tobaccoij + ρ6Tobaccoij ∗ Insuranceir
+ ρ7Y eart ∗ Insuranceir ∗ Tobaccoij + ijrt (4)
Where Y eart includes a set of year dummies. Estimating the above equation not only allows
me to test the dynamic effect, but also to test the crucial assumption that validates the DDD
estimation: in the absence of the insurance policy, the production and financial behaviors of
tobacco households and non-tobacco households should evolve similarly.
The magnitude of the impact of insurance provision on household behavior can be differ-
ent for different groups of households. I consider two types of heterogeneity here, depending
on farming size and the importance of migration remittance in household income. The
regression is as follows:
Yijrt = γ0+γ1Afterit + γ2Insuranceir + γ3Tobaccoij + γ4Afterit ∗ Insuranceir
+ γ5Afterit ∗ Tobaccoij + γ6Tobaccoij ∗ Insuranceir
+ γ7Afterit ∗ Insuranceir ∗ Tobaccoij + γ8Indexit + γ9Indexit ∗ Afterit
+ γ10Indexit ∗ Insuranceir + γ11Indexit ∗ Tobaccoij + γ12Indexit ∗ Afterit ∗ Insuranceir
+ γ13Indexit ∗ Afterit ∗ Tobaccoij + γ14Indexit ∗ Insuranceir ∗ Tobaccoij
+ γ15Indexit ∗ Afterit ∗ Insuranceir ∗ Tobaccoij + ijrt (5)
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Where Indexit is an indicator equal to 1 if, in the pre-policy period (2000-2002), the house-
holds’ total production area or the percentage of migration remittance in total income is
higher than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest is γ15.
5.2 Estimation Results
Tables 5 - 8 report DD and DDD estimation results on the effect of insurance provision on
households’ production, borrowing, and saving decisions, respectively17. Look first at the
effect on production. Refer to Column (1) in Table 5, the increase in tobacco production post
of 2002 is 1.161 mu larger for households in treatment regions compared with households
in control regions. Because the pre-policy mean of tobacco production in treatment regions
is about 5.25 mu (refer to Table 2), this result means that insurance provision can raise
tobacco production by 22%. This is consistent with the story that, as the expected return of
tobacco production increases once insurance is provided, insurance gives households greater
incentives to invest more heavily in tobacco production. Column (2) includes year dummies in
addition, and the magnitude of the effect increased slightly. In Column (3), I further control
for household characteristics, including household size, annual household income, age, and
education of household head. The magnitude of the treatment effect remains similar, at
around 1.2 mu (23%). Column (3) also shows that households with higher annual income
tend to produce more tobacco, as the production cost of tobacco cultivation is high relative
to that of other crops. Moreover, larger households, and those with more well-educated and
younger household heads, are likely to have a larger production scale. This can be explained
by the fact that tobacco production not only requires more labor than other production, but
also thorough knowledge of the techniques necessary to have high yield and good quality
tobacco.
In Table 6, I look at the impact of insurance provision on households’ choice of production
diversification, which is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of agricultural production.
The results show that agricultural production became less diversified after the insurance was
provided, by around 29%. This means that households tend to focus more on producing the
insured crop after the intervention.
Second, Table 7 reports the DDD estimation results on the effect of insurance on bor-
rowing. Results suggest a significant insurance treatment effect on borrowing, of around 972
RMB. Comparing this result to the average loan size of tobacco households in treatment
regions before 2003 (shown in Table 2) tells us that tobacco households borrow 25% more
once their production is insured.
17Please note that the DDD framework is not applicable to estimating the effect on tobacco production
area, because there is almost no tobacco production for non-tobacco households
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Third, the effect of insurance provision on household saving is reported in Table 8. Ac-
cording to Columns (1) and (2), after the tobacco insurance policy was introduced, the
increase in the average saving rate of tobacco households in treatment regions is around 1.24
percentage points lower than that of tobacco households in control regions. This means that
providing insurance can decrease a household’s saving rate by more than 30%. In Columns
(3) and (4), I consider the level of net saving rather than the saving rate. The estimation
results show that, while the insurance policy has a significant impact on saving rate, it does
not significantly influence the level of saving. Finally, in Columns (5) and (6), I estimate the
effect of insurance on the composition of saving. In China, households can have two types
of saving accounts: fixed-term saving or flexible-term saving (like checking accounts in the
United states). I show that the insurance policy does not have any statistically significant
impact on the composition of saving.
The dynamic impact of insurance provision on households’ borrowing and saving behav-
ior is illustrated in Table 9. The result shows that first, before the insurance policy was
introduced, there is no significant difference between households with or without tobacco
production, because interactions of 2001-2002 year dummies, region, and sector are insignif-
icant. Second, according to Column (1), the effect of insurance provision on borrowing is
insignificant until two years after the intervention. However, both the magnitude and signif-
icance of the effect persists through the end of our sample period. In contrast, according to
Column (2), insurance impact on household saving become significant three years after the
policy was introduced, but the magnitude and significance decrease and become insignificant
toward the end of the sample period.
In Table 10, I report the heterogeneity in the impact of insurance, depending on how
large the farming size is, and how important is the migration remittance to the household’s
income. Columns (1) - (3) shows that insurance provision has a larger effect on borrowing
for large farmers, while the effect on production and saving is not statistically different for
farmers with different farming sizes. In Columns (4) - (6), I show that the effect of insurance
policy has a smaller impact on the production and borrowing decisions of households who
depend more on migration remittance.
Once the insurance policy was implemented for tobacco farmers, we may expect an en-
dogenous switch of non-tobacco households to tobacco households. If a significant number of
households do so, the effect might be overestimated. In Table 11, I report the percentage of
households that stay in the same sector, switch from tobacco to the non-tobacco sector, and
switch from the non-tobacco sector to the tobacco sector between the previous and current
year, for treatment and control regions. This table shows that only a very small fraction of
households changed sectors during the sample period. I did a robustness check by excluding
16
all households that had ever switched sectors and it does not change the effect much.
6 Conclusions
Household incomes in developing rural economies are subject to great uncertainty. As a
result, many developing countries are making efforts to improve the quality and coverage
of agricultural insurance products. Taking advantage of a natural experiment of insurance
provision in rural China, this paper uses both DD and DDD estimations to study the effect
of insurance provision on households’ production and financial decisions. I find that house-
holds tend to increase tobacco production once it is insured. Moreover, insurance not only
makes households borrow more from the bank, but also decrease the household saving rate.
However, while the impact of insurance on borrowing persists in the long-run, the impact on
saving is only significant in the medium-run and vanishes in the long-run.
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Figure 1. Evolution of Tobacco Production, by Treatment
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Figure 2. Evolution of Loan Size for Tobacco Households, by Treatment
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Figure 3. Evolution of Loan Size for Other Households, by Treatment
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Figure 4. Evolution of Saving for Tobacco Households, by Treatment
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Figure 5. Evolution of Saving for Other Households, by Treatment
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County
Insurance 
Provision Start Year Premium
Subsidy of 
Premium
Maximum 
Payout
Guangchang Yes 2003 12 50% 420
Yihuang Yes 2003 12 50% 420
Lean Yes 2003 12 50% 420
Zixi Yes 2003 12 50% 420
Shicheng No
Ningdu No
Ganxian No
Huichang No
Xinfeng No
Xingguo No
Quannan No
Ruijin No
Table 1. Insurance Provision in Tobacco Production Counties of Jiangxi Province
Notes: The unit of premium and payouts is RMB per mu (1 mu = 1/15 hectare). The exchange rate between US 
dollars and RMB is around 6.3.  
22
Other Households All Sample
Treated Control Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Households 1429 2151 2968 6548
Gender of Household Head (1 = Male, 0 = Female) 0.996 0.982 0.014*** 0.978 0.983
(0.062) (0.134) (0.000) (0.146) (0.131)
Age 40.418 40.731 -0.313* 40.205 40.429
(8.959) (8.124) (0.091) (8.645) (8.526)
Household Size 4.781 4.728 0.053* 4.930 4.832
(1.022) (1.355) (0.054) (1.312) (1.284)
Education (0 = illiteracy, 1 = primary, 1.626 1.759 -0.133*** 1.813 1.760
2 = secondary, 3 = high school, 4 = college) (0.54) (0.929) (0.000) (0.644) (0.746)
Area of Tobacco Production (mu) 5.249 4.999 0.249*** 0.307 2.857
(2.119) (2.874) (0.000) (1.194) (3.175)
Production Diversification Index (0-1) 0.389 0.275 0.114*** 0.119 0.237
(0.229) (0.261) (0.000) (0.203) -0.256
Annual Household Income  (10,000 RMB) 1.065 1.202 -0.137*** 0.727 0.956
(0.477) (1.402) (0.000) (0.941) (1.094)
Loan Size (10,000 RMB) 0.390 0.456 -0.066*** 0.498 0.483
(0.203) (0.189) (0.003) (0.089) (0.13)
Saving Rate (Net Saving Divided by Income) 0.036 0.045 -0.009*** 0.034 0.038
(0.079) (0.12) (0.003) (0.093) (0.101)
Notes: This table reports the mean of key variables in pre-treatment periods (2000-2002). For columns (1), (2), (4) and (5), standard deviations are in 
brackets. For column (3), P-value for F test of equal means of two groups are in brackets. 
Tobacco Households
Table 2. Summary Statistics
VARIABLES
Area of Tobacco 
Production (mu)
Loan Size (10,000 
RMB)
Saving Rate (Net Saving 
Divided by Income) 
(1) (2) (3)
Year 0.322 -0.0543** 0.0163**
(0.305) (0.0233) (0.00776)
Insurance 0.123 -0.110*** 0.00429
(= 0 if control region, = 1 if treatment region) (0.305) (0.0161) (0.0383)
Year*Insurance 0.160 0.0708*** -0.00860
(0.308) (0.0233) (0.00776)
Observations 9,201 659 5,761
R-squared 0.080 0.034 0.006
Table 3. Test Common Trend in Key Outcome Variables Before Policy Intervention
Notes: Bootstrap clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2000-2002 2003-2008 Difference 2000-2002 2003-2008 Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I. Area of Tobacco Production (mu)
Treatment 5.249 8.464 3.215***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.000)
Control 4.999 7.054 2.054***
(0.037) (0.027) (0.000)
DD 1.161***
(0.000)
II. Loan Size (10,000 RMB)
Treatment 0.390 0.724 0.004*** 0.412 0.568 0.156***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.000) (0.006) (0.011) (0.000)
Control 0.456 0.645 0.189*** 0.523 0.630 0.108***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.000) (0.002) (0.032) (0.000)
DD 0.145*** 0.048
(0.000) (0.163)
DDD 0.097**
(0.036)
III. Saving Rate (Net Saving Divided by Income)
Treatment 0.036 0.086 0.049*** 0.020 0.098 0.078***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Control 0.045 0.093 0.049*** 0.037 0.064 0.028***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
DD 0.001 0.05***
(0.804) (0.000)
DDD -0.05***
(0.000)
Tobacco Households Other Households
Table 4. Area of Tobacco Production, Loan Size, and Saving Rate by Region, Sector, and Year 
Notes: For columns (1), (2), (4) and (5), standard deviations are in brackets. For columns (3) and (6), P-value are in brackets. 
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3)
After 2.054*** 7.938*** 7.279***
(= 0 if 2000-2002, = 1 if 2003-2008) (0.320) (2.261) (1.938)
Insurance 0.249 0.175 0.338***
(= 0 if control region, = 1 if treatment region) (0.370) (0.195) (0.112)
After * Insurance 1.161*** 1.450*** 1.223***
(0.320) (0.167) (0.116)
Household Size 0.0727***
(0.00790)
Annual Household Income  (10,000 RMB) 0.787***
(0.257)
Education (0 = illiteracy, 1 = primary, 0.343*
2 = secondary, 3 = high school, 4 = college) (0.178)
Age -0.0252**
(0.0112)
No. of Observation 31,207 31,207 31,207
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.105 0.131 0.226
Table 5. Effect of Insurance Provision on Production
Area of Tobacco Production (mu)
Notes: Bootstrap clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3)
After 0.0543 0.0364 0.0268
(= 0 if 2000-2002, = 1 if 2003-2008) (0.0536) (0.063) (0.0550)
Insurance -0.0492 -0.0525 -0.0470
(= 0 if control region, = 1 if treatment region) (0.0753) (0.0524) (0.0759)
Tobacco Household 0.144** 0.144*** 0.145***
(= 0 if No, = 1 if Yes) (0.0585) (0.0214) (0.0491)
After * Insurance 0.0755 0.0670 0.0657
(0.0536) (0.0607) (0.0612)
After * Tobacco Household -0.0320 -0.0433 -0.0482
(0.0320) (0.0386) (0.0336)
Tobacco Household * Insurance 0.164*** 0.168*** 0.171***
(0.0585) (0.0237) (0.0496)
After * Insurance * Tobacco Household -0.129*** -0.116*** -0.113***
(0.0320) (0.0440) (0.0366)
Household Size 0.00382
(0.00256)
Education (0 = illiteracy, 1 = primary, 0.0510***
2 = secondary, 3 = high school, 4 = college) (0.0195)
Age 0.00312***
(0.000371)
No. of Observation 47951 47951 47951
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.106 0.112 0.141
Table 6. Effect of Insurance Provision on Production Diversification
Production Diversification (0-1)
Notes: Bootstrap clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3)
After 0.108 1.889*** 1.679***
(= 0 if 2000-2002, = 1 if 2003-2008) (0.0769) (0.659) (0.328)
Insurance -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.133***
(= 0 if control region, = 1 if treatment region) (0.0109) (0.0119) (0.0185)
After * Insurance 0.0481 0.0505 0.0923**
(0.0769) (0.0615) (0.0368)
Tobacco Household -0.0665** -0.0669*** -0.147***
(= 0 if No, = 1 if Yes) (0.0272) (0.0240) (0.0172)
After * Tobacco Household 0.0810 0.0636 0.146***
(0.0583) (0.0649) (0.0389)
Tobacco Household * Insurance 0.0441 0.0183 0.0267
(0.0272) (0.0309) (0.0336)
After * Insurance * Tobacco Household 0.0972* 0.134* 0.115**
(0.0583) (0.0757) (0.0556)
Household Size 0.00125
(0.00656)
Annual Household Income  (10,000 RMB) 0.0911***
(0.0137)
Area of Tobacco Production (mu) 0.00208
(0.00292)
Education (0 = illiteracy, 1 = primary, 0.0642***
2 = secondary, 3 = high school, 4 = college) (0.0163)
Age -0.00103
(0.000739)
No. of Observation 8,382 8,382 8,382
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.017 0.029 0.081
Table 7. Effect of Insurance Provision on Borrowing
Notes: Bootstrap clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Loan Size (10,000 RMB)
26
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 0.0275*** 0.0906*** 0.0561*** 0.190 -0.0212 -0.173***
(= 0 if 2000-2002, = 1 if 2003-2008) (0.00576) (0.0311) (0.00372) (0.129) (0.0791) (0.0545)
Insurance -0.0166 -0.0149*** -0.00219 0.0101 -0.472*** -0.487***
(= 0 if control region, = 1 if treatment region) (0.0218) (0.00391) (0.00797) (0.00865) (0.166) (0.114)
After * Insurance 0.0504*** 0.0294*** 0.0834*** 0.00267 0.272*** 0.269***
(0.00576) (0.00509) (0.00372) (0.0142) (0.0791) (0.0857)
Tobacco Household 0.00781 0.0132*** 0.0360 0.0347 -0.352 -0.349
(= 0 if No, = 1 if Yes) (0.0244) (0.00263) (0.0456) (0.0340) (0.294) (0.243)
After * Tobacco Household 0.0211* -0.00141 0.0562 -0.000966 -0.0420 -0.0534
(0.0109) (0.00332) (0.0583) (0.0304) (0.290) (0.296)
Tobacco Household * Insurance 0.00801 0.00343 -0.00975 -0.0194 0.121 0.120
(0.0244) (0.00471) (0.0456) (0.0422) (0.294) (0.244)
After * Insurance * Tobacco Household -0.0495*** -0.0124** -0.0708 0.0414 0.169 0.190
(0.0109) (0.00617) (0.0583) (0.0359) (0.290) (0.299)
Household Size 0.00285*** 0.00599* 0.00570
(0.000544) (0.00338) (0.00464)
Annual Household Income  (10,000 RMB) -0.0117*** 0.00731 -0.0512
(0.000448) (0.0115) (0.0329)
Education (0 = illiteracy, 1 = primary, 0.0235*** 0.0322*** -0.0208
2 = secondary, 3 = high school, 4 = college) (0.000951) (0.00796) (0.0186)
Age 0.000540*** 0.000542 -0.00173***
(8.34e-05) (0.000429) (0.000620)
No. of Observation 40,561 40,559 40,561 40,559 20,975 20,975
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.027 0.077 0.012 0.043 0.12 0.13
Notes: Bootstrap clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Saving Rate (Net Saving 
Divided by Income) 
Ratio of Net Checking to Net 
Total Saving
Table 8. Effect of Insurance Provision on Saving
Net Saving (10,000 RMB)
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VARIABLES Loan Size (10,000 RMB) Saving Rate (Net Saving Divided by Income) 
(1) (2)
Insurance -0.122*** -0.00960**
(= 0 if control region, = 1 if treatment region) (0.0136) (0.00428)
Tobacco Household -0.0224 0.0127***
(= 0 if No, = 1 if Yes) (0.0261) (0.00167)
Tobacco Household * Insurance 0.00750 -0.00168
(0.0309) (0.00475)
2001 * Insurance * Tobacco Household -0.0591
(0.0364)
2002 * Insurance * Tobacco Household -0.0176 0.00822
(0.0395) (0.00860)
2003 * Insurance * Tobacco Household 0.0185 -0.00740
(0.107) (0.00919)
2004 * Insurance * Tobacco Household 0.0970 -0.0127
(0.107) (0.00903)
2005 * Insurance * Tobacco Household 0.138*** -0.0115
(0.0395) (0.0108)
2006 * Insurance * Tobacco Household 0.217*** -0.0187**
(0.0287) (0.00955)
2007 * Insurance * Tobacco Household 0.150*** -0.0147**
(0.0561) (0.00713)
2008 * Insurance * Tobacco Household 0.210*** -0.0111
(0.0568) (0.00902)
No. of Observation 8,382 40,561
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Dummies * Insurance Yes Yes
Year Dummies * Tobacco Household Yes Yes
R-squared 0.021 0.057
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9. Dynamic Effects of Insurance Provision on Borrowing and Saving
28
VARIABLES
Area of 
Tobacco 
Production 
(mu)
Loan Size 
(10,000 RMB)
Saving Rate 
(Net Saving 
Divided by 
Income) 
Area of Tobacco 
Production (mu)
Loan Size 
(10,000 RMB)
Saving Rate 
(Net Saving 
Divided by 
Income) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 8.180*** 1.875*** 0.0588*** 7.616*** 2.018*** 0.0655***
(= 0 if 2000-2002, = 1 if 2003-2008) (3.141) (0.114) (0.0137) (1.807) (0.0676) (0.0251)
Insurance 0.764*** -0.0924*** 0.0358*** 0.381*** -0.104*** -0.00684
(= 0 if control region, = 1 if treatment region) (0.283) (0.00290) (0.00182) (0.132) (2.47e-05) (0.0508)
Tobacco Household -0.0834*** -0.0172** -0.102*** -0.00981
(= 0 if No, = 1 if Yes) (0.00157) (0.00718) (0.00645) (0.0305)
After * Insurance 1.225*** 0.0631*** 0.0361*** 1.493*** -0.0323 0.0318*
(0.175) (0.0220) (0.00197) (0.0816) (0.0490) (0.0187)
After * Tobacco Household 0.113*** 0.0222*** -0.00452 0.0247
(0.00939) (0.000263) (0.0288) (0.0209)
Tobacco Household * Insurance 0.0180*** -0.0233*** 0.0437*** 0.0263
(0.00125) (0.00785) (0.0101) (0.0310)
After * Insurance * Tobacco Household 0.0294*** 0.00355*** 0.258*** -0.0396*
(0.0108) (0.000700) (0.0527) (0.0206)
Pre-treatment Total Production Area 2.178*** -0.0102*** -0.0288***
(= 0 if < Median, = 1 if > Median) (0.637) (0.00211) (0.00213)
Pre-treatment Total Production Area * After -0.163* 0.203*** 0.00760***
(0.0873) (0.0649) (0.00164)
Pre-treatment Total Production Area * Insurance -1.374** -0.0126*** -0.0327***
(0.676) (0.00234) (0.00218)
Pre-treatment Total Production Area * Tobacco Household 0.0295 0.0606***
(0.0289) (0.0195)
Pre-treatment Total Production Area 0.0177 -0.178*** -0.0187***
*After * Insurance (0.112) (0.0658) (0.00198)
Pre-treatment Total Production Area -0.224*** -0.0309**
* After * Tobacco Household (0.0286) (0.0148)
Pre-treatment Total Production Area -0.0107 -0.00221
* Tobacco Household * Insurance (0.0289) (0.0199)
Pre-treatment Total Production Area 0.291*** -0.00808
* After * Insurance * Tobacco Household (0.0290) (0.0153)
Pre-treatment Share of Migration Income in Total Income -0.291** -0.00283 0.0180
(0.117) (0.00211) (0.0316)
Pre-treatment Share of Migration Income in Total Income 0.239* -0.146*** -0.00792
* After (0.124) (0.00939) (0.0141)
Pre-treatment Share of Migration Income in Total Income -1.092*** -0.0279*** -0.0254
* Insurance (0.0873) (0.00407) (0.0315)
Pre-treatment Share of Migration Income in Total Income -0.280*** 0.218*** -0.00658
* Tobacco Households (0.0948) (0.0158) (0.0141)
Pre-treatment Share of Migration Income in Total Income 0.0132 0.0281
*After * Insurance (0.0608) (0.0351)
Pre-treatment Share of Migration Income in Total Income 0.194* -0.0347
* After * Tobacco Household (0.115) (0.0236)
Pre-treatment Share of Migration Income in Total Income -0.0458 -0.0393
* Tobacco Household * Insurance (0.0768) (0.0351)
Pre-treatment Share of Migration Income in Total Income -0.278** 0.0319
* After * Insurance * Tobacco Household (0.129) (0.0237)
Observations 34,207 8,382 40,561 34,207 8,382 40,561
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.208 0.030 0.074 0.157 0.036 0.070
Notes: Bootstrap clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10. Heterogeneity of the Insurance Effect: Production Size and Migration Income
Production Size Migration Income
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Year
Tobacco to Non-
Tobacco No Change
Non-Tobacco to 
Tobacco
Tobacco to Non-
Tobacco No Change
Non-Tobacco to 
Tobacco
2000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2001 0 100 0 0.08 99.92 0
2002 0 98.72 1.28 0 94.97 5.03
2003 0.32 99.68 0 0.53 99.42 0.05
2004 0.63 99.37 0 0.32 99.17 0.51
2005 0 99.81 0.19 0 99.63 0.37
2006 0.23 99.53 0.23 0 99.9 0.1
2007 0.4 99.6 0 0.54 99.29 0.17
2008 0.42 99.43 0.14 0.11 99.33 0.56
Treatment Regions Control Regions
Table 11. Percentage of Households Changing Sector by Region and Year
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Appendices
A Two-period model when insurance is not provided
Combine equation (3.1) and (3.4) we can get:
U ′(C1) = βpU ′(Cg)F ′(I) = βpU ′(Cg)(1 +RB) (3.6)
⇒ Cg
C1
=
F (I)−(1+RB)B+(1+Rf )S
C1
= βp(1 +RB)
⇒ C1 = F (I)−(1+RB)B+(1+Rf )Sβp(1+RB)
=
“
1+RB
α
” α
α−1−(1+RB)B+(1+Rf )S
βp(1+RB)
(3.7)
Rewrite equation (3.3) as:
βpU ′(Cg)F ′(I) = βpU ′(Cg)(1 +Rf ) + β(1− p)U ′ [(1 +Rf )S] (1 +Rf ) (3.3)’
Then combine (3.3)’ with equation (3.7) we have:
1
C1
=
βp(1+Rf )
F (I)−(1+RB)B+(1+Rf )S +
β(1−p)
S
= βp(1+RB)“
1+RB
α
” α
α−1−(1+RB)B+(1+Rf )S
⇒ βp(RB−Rf )
F (I)−(1+RB)B+(1+Rf )S =
β(1−p)
S
⇒ βp(RB −Rf )S = β(1− p)[F (I)− (1 +RB)B + (1 +Rf )S]
⇒ (1 +RB)B = F (I)− p1−p(RB −Rf )S + (1 +Rf )S
⇒ B = α− αα−1 (1 +RB) 1α−1 − S
[
p
1−p
RB−Rf
RB+1
− 1+Rf
1+RB
]
(3.8)
Plug equation (3.8) into (3.7)
⇒ C1 = 11−p
RB−Rf
β(1+RB)
S (3.9)
We know that the total investment is:
I = W0 − C1 +B − S
Replace C1 and B by (3.9) and (3.8), respectively, we have:
I = W0 − 11−p
RB−Rf
β(1+RB)
S − S + α− αα−1 (1 +RB) 1α−1 − S
[
p
1−p
RB−Rf
RB+1
− 1+Rf
1+RB
]
⇒ (1− α−1)I = (1− α−1) (1+RB
α
) 1
α−1
= W0 − 1+ββ(1−p)
RB−Rf
RB+1
S
⇒ S∗ = (1+RB)(1−p)β
(1+β)(RB−Rf )
[
W0 + (α
−1 − 1) (1+RB
α
) 1
α−1
]
= A ∗
[
W0 + (α
−1 − 1) (1+RB
α
) 1
α−1
]
(3.10)
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Now let’s consider consumption. Plug the expression of S into equation (3.9):
C1 =
1
1−p
RB−Rf
β(1+RB)
(1+RB)(1−p)β
(1+β)(RB−Rf )
[
W0 + (α
−1 − 1) (1+RB
α
) 1
α−1
]
= 1
1+β
[
W0 + (α
−1 − 1) (1+RB
α
) 1
α−1
]
(3.11)
The last variable that we are interested in is the borrowing. According to equation (3.8):
B = α−
α
α−1 (1 +RB)
1
α−1 − S
[
p
1−p
RB−Rf
RB+1
− 1+Rf
1+RB
]
= D + S ∗ E
where D = α−
α
α−1 (1 +RB)
1
α−1 and E = 1+Rf
1+RB
− p
1−p
RB−Rf
RB+1
B Two-period model when insurance is provided
From equation (3.13), we can see that the expression of optimal investment is:
F ′(I) = (1 +RB)(1 + δ)⇒ I∗ =
(
(1+RB)(1+δ)
α
) 1
α−1
Rewrite equations (3.12) and (3.14) as:
1
C1
= βp(1+RB)
Cg
+ β(1−p)γ
Cb(1+δ)
(3.15)
βp(RB−Rf )
Cg
+ β(1−p)γ
Cb(1+δ)
=
β(1−p)(1+Rf )
Cb
⇒ Cg = ACb, A = (RB−Rf )p(1−p)[(1+Rf )(1+δ)−γ] (3.16)
Plug expression (3.16) into (3.15):
1
C1
= βp(1+RB)
ACb(1+δ)
+ β(1−p)γ
Cb(1+δ)
⇒ Cb = βp(1+RB)+β(1−p)γAA(1+δ) C1 = γ1+δ (W0 − C1 − S +B)− γ1+δB + (1 +Rf )S
⇒ βp(1+RB)+β(1−p)γA
A(1+δ)
C1 =
γ
1+δ
W0 − γ1+δC1 − γ1+δS + (1 +Rf )S (3.17)
⇒ S = 1
1+Rf−γ/(1+δ)
[
γ
1+δ
+ βp(1+RB)+β(1−p)γA
A(1+δ)
]
C1 − γW0(1+Rf )(1+δ)−γ (3.18)
Combining (3.16) and (3.17) we can get:
Cg = [βp(1 +RB) + β(1− p)γA]C1
⇒ [βp(1 +RB) + β(1− p)γA]C1 = f(RB)− (1 +RB)B + (1 +Rf )S
⇒ B = (1 +RB) 1α−1 (1 + δ) αα−1α− αα−1 − D1+RBC1 +
1+Rf
1+RB
S (3.19)
Becasue the total investment is I = B+[W0−C1−S]
1+δ
, according to equation (3.18) and (3.19)
we have:
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(
(1+RB)(1+δ)
α
) 1
α−1
=[
(RB−Rf )γ+(1+RB)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
(1+RB)(1+δ)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
W0 + (1 +RB)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1α−
α
α−1
]
− [D + E]C1
⇒ C∗1 = 1D+E
[
(RB−Rf )γ+(1+RB)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
(1+RB)(1+δ)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
W0 + (α
−1 − 1)(1+RB
α
)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1
]
(3.20)
Where D = (1+βp)(1+RB)+β(1−p)A
(1+RB)(1+δ)
E =
RB−Rf
(1+RB)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
Aγ+βp(1+RB)+β(1−p)Aγ
A(1+δ)
⇒ S∗ = (1+RB)(1+δ)
RB−Rf
E
D+E
(RB−Rf )γ+(1+RB)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
(1+RB)(1+δ)[(1+δ)(1+Rf )−γ]
W0
+ (1+RB)(1+δ)
RB−Rf
E
D+E
(α−1 − 1)(1+RB
α
)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
1
α−1 − γW0
(1+Rf )(1+δ)−γ (21)
B∗ = (1 +RB)
1
α−1 (1 + δ)
α
α−1α−
α
α−1 − D
1+RB
C∗1 +
1+Rf
1+RB
S∗ (3.22)
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